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Box 1: Details of the current means test for long-term care and reforms analysed in this paper 
 
An individual’s entitlement to state help with the costs of long-term care depends on an assessment of 
their care needs and on a means test 
The current means test 
• If the individual has capital above an ‘upper capital threshold’, currently £23,250, the individual 
pays the full cost of their care. For residential care, the value of the home is usually included in 
capital after the first 12 weeks.  
• When capital is below £23,250, the state meets some of the cost depending on the individual’s 
assessable income. 
• Assessable income includes a notional weekly income, known as ‘tariff income’ on capital 
between a ‘lower capital threshold’, currently £14,250 and the upper capital threshold. The 
current rate of tariff income is £1 for each £250 between the lower and upper capital thresholds. 
Capital up to the lower capital threshold, and any income from it, is ignored completely in the 
means test. 
 
The Government’s announced reforms 
• Once an individual has received ‘eligible care’ to the value of the lifetime cap, the state will meet 
their ‘eligible care costs’ Eligible care is the package of care that the individual has been assessed 
as needing; eligible care costs are the costs of that care calculated at the prices that the Local 
Authority pays. In residential care, eligible care excludes the general living costs element of care 
home fees sometimes known as ‘hotel costs’ – board, food, heating etc. The liftime cap is 
expected to be £75,000 in 2017. 
• The upper capital threshold in residential care will be increased and is expected to be £123,000 in 
2017. 
• In residential care, hotel costs will remain means tested and are expected to be £12,000 in 2017. 
 
Two variants on the Government’s announced reforms 
We examine two variations on the Government’s announced regforms. In addition to changes above, 
these would: 
• halve the rate of tariff income from £1 per £250 to £1 per £500 
Or, at a similar cost 
• increase the lower capital threshold to £41,600 in 2017 prices. 
 
The central recommendation of the Dilnot Commission on Funding Care and Support 
• This is similar to the Government’s plans except that the recommended lifetime cap was £35,000 
in 2010 prices, or about £43,000 in 2017 prices. 
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Summary 
The UK Government recently announced plans to reform the system that determines how much the 
state contributes to people’s long-term care costs. The reforms will start in 2016 and introduce a 
lifetime cap on the costs an individual will need to pay towards ‘eligible’ care and support needs. 
They will also increase the upper capital threshold above which care home residents are ineligible 
for local authority help with their care home fees. This increase will extend the possibility of state 
support to those care home residents who are currently excluded from state help because they have 
capital, usually including the value of their home, above the current capital threshold of £23,250. 
The lifetime cap is expected to be £75,000 in 2017 , and the upper capital threshold in residential 
care will be increased to £123,000.  
This paper examines projected costs and distributional effects of these plans compared with the 
current system. It also contrasts these costs and distributional effects with the central 
recommendation of the Commission on the Funding of Care and Support (Dilnot Commission) which 
was set up by the Government and reported in 2011. The Commission’s central recommendation 
was for a cap of £35,000 and upper capital threshold of £100,000 in 2010 prices. We also consider 
two variants on the Government’s plans which would give additional help to recipients of residential 
care with capital below the proposed higher capital threshold (see Box 1 for how these compare 
with the current system, the Government’s plans and the recommendations of the Dilnot 
Commission). 
Our main findings are: 
• Currently public expenditure in England on social care services for older people and on disability 
benefits that older people use towards their care costs is estimated to be £12 billion in 2010. 
We project that this will rise to more than double that by 2030 (£25.5 billion in 2010 prices). As 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product the rise is less steep; from just under 1% in 2010 to 
1.3% by 2030. 
• We project that the government plans would add £2 billion (2010 prices) to public expenditure 
by 2030. This is in contrast to an extra £3.3 billion that we project would be the cost of the 
central Dilnot recommendation by 2030. 
• Halving the rate of tariff income from capital between the lower and upper thresholds in 
residential care would add £0.15 billion to the cost of the Government’s plans by 2030. Raising 
the lower capital threshold below which all capital is disregarded, to the equivalent of £40,000 
in 2010 prices, would cost a similar amount.  
• We project that under the government plans there would be some 115,000 more users of care 
services receiving some public funding in 2030 than if the current system continued. This is in 
contrast to our projection of around 185,000 more publicly funded users in 2030 under the 
central Dilnot recommendation. 
• The estimated weekly gains from all the reform options are greatest amongst care recipients in 
the highest quintile (fifth) of the income distribution for people aged 85+. For example, in 2030, 
the Government’s plans would be worth £52 per week (2010 prices) on average to care 
recipients aged 85+ in the highest quintile compared with £20 for those in the lowest quintile. 
Expressed as percentages of income the gains vary much less across the income distribution.  
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• Focussing on care home residents, both variants on the Government’s plans would be 
particularly advantageous to lower income care home recipients. In 2030 the average gains of 
care home residents aged 85+ in the lowest 3 income quintile would be about 16% higher under 
these variants than under the proposed reforms. This compares with around 6% higher for the 
upper two quintiles. 
• These projections assume that the level of the cap is linked to real earnings growth indefinitely 
but that capital thresholds are linked to real earnings growth only until 2017 and are held 
constant in real terms thereafter. If capital thresholds were linked to real earnings indefinitely, 
the public expenditure cost of the Government plans would be £2.23 billion in 2030 compared 
with £1.96 billion if they were held constant after 2017. 
 
Introduction 
On 11th February the UK Government issued a policy statement on care and support funding 
(Department of Health, 2013). The key features of its planned reforms are: 
• a lifetime cap on the costs an individual will need to pay towards eligible care and support 
needs , expected to be £75,000 when introduced in 2017 (£61,000 in 2010 prices);  
• an increase in the residential care upper capital threshold above which there is no state help 
towards care home fees; the threshold is expected to be £123,000 in 2017 (£100,000 in 2010 
prices) compared with £23,250 now; 
• for residential care, eligible care costs that count towards the cap are expected to be the 
difference between the publicly-funded rate for care home fees and so-called ‘hotel costs’, set 
at around £12,000 in 2017 (£10,000 in 2010 prices). Public help with hotel costs will remain 
means tested. 
Since then the Government has said that it will introduce these changes in 2016, with a cap of 
around £72,000 and an upper capital threshold in residential care of £118,000 in 2016 prices 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer 2013). Our interpretation is that this would not alter the levels of the 
cap or upper threshold in 2017 i.e. in 2017 they would be £75,000 and £123,000 respectively. 
The lifetime cap is higher than the £35,000 (2010 prices) recommended by the Commission on 
Funding Care and Support (CFCS) chaired by Andrew Dilnot (CFCS, 2011). The increase in the capital 
threshold and the level of hotel costs match the CFCS central recommendation.  
We have previously analysed the CFCS recommendations (Wittenberg et al. 2011). Here we update 
that analysis to take account of the Government’s recent policy statement, examining also two 
variations on the Government’s planned reform. These variations illustrate the effect of providing a 
little more state help to those with capital below the new higher threshold. For comparison we 
compare our results with a cap of £35,000 (2010 prices) recommended by the CFCS which would be 
around £43,000 in 2017 prices. 
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Two potential variations on the Government’s announced reforms 
Under the existing means test for public support with care home fees, individuals with capital above 
the upper threshold, currently £23,250, have to meet their care home fees in full without any state 
help. The value of their home is usually included in capital. Those with capital below the upper limit 
can be entitled to state help depending on their income. The first £14,250 of capital is disregarded 
completely but capital between this lower threshold and the upper threshold is assumed to generate 
a ‘tariff’ income of £1 for every £250 of capital. This tariff income is added to other sources of 
income when applying the means test. The proposed increase in the upper threshold will extend the 
range of capital on which this tariff income will be calculated and will offset the effect of that 
increase – partially for those with capital well below the new upper threshold but potentially fully 
for those with capital near the new upper threshold. We therefore examine two ways in which the 
effect of this offset could be reduced: 
1. A reduction in the tariff rate to £1 for every £500 of capital, which is the rate used in means-
tested social security benefits. 
2. An increase in the lower capital threshold in residential care, thereby increasing the amount of 
capital that is disregarded completely and hence entirely protected. We examine an increase in 
the lower capital threshold to £40,000 in 2010 prices (or £41,600 in 2017 prices) since the cost 
to the public purse would be close to the cost of reducing the tariff rate to £1 in £500. 
 
Methods and assumptions 
We use two linked simulation models: the Personal Social Services Research Unit’s (PSSRU) 
aggregate long-term care projections model and the University of East Anglia’s CARESIM dynamic 
micro-simulation. The current versions of the models have a base year of 2010 and incorporate the 
2010-based official population projections (Office for National Statistics, 2011) and recent 
projections of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) made by the Office for Budget Responsibility (2012). 
These models allow us to make projections of the public costs of the current funding system for 
long-term care for older people in England (the base case), and of potential reforms to it, along with 
the distribution of gains from reforms according to care recipients’ income levels. More details on 
the models’ methods, data sources and assumptions are given in Wittenberg et al. (2011). Key points 
to note are: 
• The results relate to England: since social care services are a devolved function the 
Government’s plans relate specifically to England only. 
• Our analysis relates to people aged 65+ only: since fewer younger people needing care are likely 
to have substantial capital, the costs will relate mainly to older people.  
• The base year for the projections is 2010 and all results are given in 2010 prices. 
• Public expenditure on long-term care is defined to include not only expenditure on social care 
services provided via Local Authorities but also expenditure on disability benefits that are used 
by their recipients to fund social care. 
• Patterns of care, such as the balance between formal and informal care and residential and 
home-based care are held constant. 
• Future unit costs of care are assumed to rise in line with real earnings growth . 
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• Real earnings growth is assumed to be zero until 2015 and 2% per annum thereafter. 
• The lifetime cap and hotel costs are assumed to rise over time at the rate of real earnings 
growth. 
• All capital thresholds are assumed to stay constant in real terms under the current funding 
system. Under the potential funding reforms they are assumed to rise at the rate of real 
earnings growth until 2017 and to remain constant in real terms thereafter. In a sensitivity test 
we assume that, under the potential reforms, capital thresholds and hotel costs rise by real 
earnings indefinitely. 
• The new scheme is assumed for this purpose to be mature by 2020: since in practice the new 
scheme will not be mature for several years, our projections of the costs in 2020 are likely to be 
over-estimates. 
 
Results 
Projections of public expenditure on long-term care 
To set the scene, Figure 1 shows projected public expenditure, under the current funding system, on 
social care for older people in England. The chart shows projected public expenditure in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of GDP. In 2010, the base year for the projections, public expenditure is 
estimated at just over £12 billion and projected to rise to £16.3 billion in 2020 and £25.5 billion in 
2030 (in constant 2010 prices). Expressed as a percentage of GDP these correspond to just under 1%, 
rising to 1.1% by 2020 and 1.3% by 2030. 
Our modelling suggests that the Government’s announced plans would add an extra £1.3 billion to 
public expenditure in 2020, rising to an extra £2 billion by 2030 (Figure 2). These public expenditure 
costs are likely to be overestimates to the extent that the cap will not be applied in respect of care 
received prior to 2016. It is not possible to compare this directly with the Government’s estimates of 
costs, in part because of differences in the time periods to which the respective estimates relate and 
in price bases; but subject to that caveat the estimates appear to be reasonably compatible with 
those published in the Government’s 2012 progress report on funding reform (Her Majesty’s 
Government, 2012)1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Projected public expenditure on social care for older people in England 
 
                                                          
1 Figure 4 on page 34 on that report gives estimates of the cost for older people of a £75,000 cap and 
a £100,000 upper capital threshold introduced in 2015/16 of £1.3 billion by 2025/6 in 2012/3 prices, 
allowing fo savings on disability benefits. Note that estimates are also given of the assessment costs 
associated with the cap. Our cost estimates do not include assessment costs. 
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If the rate of tariff income on capital assumed for residential care was halved, in addition to the 
measures proposed by the Government, the cost compared with the current funding system would 
be an extra £1.4 billion in 2020, rising to £2.1 billion in 2030. As an alternative to cutting tariff 
income, raising the lower capital threshold in residential care to £41,600 in 2017 would cost a similar 
amount. In contrast the central recommendation of the Dilnot commission would cost an extra £2.1 
billion in 2020, increasing to £3.3 billion by 2030. 
Our projections suggest that under the government plans there would be some 115,000 more care 
service users receiving some public funding in 2030 than if the current system continued. This is in 
contrast to around 185,000 more publicly funded users in 2030 that we project under the central 
Dilnot recommendation. Supplementing the government plans with a halving of the rate of tariff 
income on capital between the upper and lower thresholds or increasing the lower threshold to 
£40,000 would mean around 1,500 more publicly funded users than under the government plan 
alone. 
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
£
s
 b
ill
io
n
public expenditure, £s bn
public expenditure, % of GDP
Long-term care funding in England 
7 
 
Figure 2 Projected extra public expenditure from reform options, post-reform capital 
thresholds linked to earnings up to 2017, prices thereafter 
 
 
If capital thresholds were linked to real earnings indefinitely, the public expenditure cost of the 
Government’s plans would be £2.23 billion in 2030 compared with £1.96 billion if they were held 
constant in real terms after 2017. This is an additional cost of just under £0.3 billion in 2030 or 14% 
of the cost when capital thresholds are held constant after 2017. The additional costs of indefinite 
earnings-linking of capital thresholds for the two variants on the Government’s plans (halving the 
rate of tariff income or raising the lower capital threshold in residential care) are £0.4 billion in 2030 
or an additional 18% of the cost when capital thresholds are linked to earnings only until 2017. The 
additional costs of indefinite earnings-linking of capital thresholds for the central Dilnot 
recommendation would be £0.3 billion in 2030 or 8% of the costs when capital thresholds are held 
constant in real terms after 2017.  
Distributional effects of funding reforms 
Figure 3 shows how the projected average gain from the funding reforms varies across quintiles 
(fifths) of the income distribution, for recipients of care aged 85+ in 2030, by which time reforms 
introduced in 2016 would be close to being mature. Figure 3a shows the average gains in absolute 
terms i.e. in £s per week. Figure 3b shows average gains expressed as a percentage of income. In 
absolute terms, all reforms favour those in highest income quintile most and those in the lowest 
income quintile the least2: average gains in the highest income quintile are around 2.5 times those in 
the lowest income quintile for all reforms examined. As a percentage of income the average gains 
are more uniformly distributed across income quintiles, although with a tendency to be highest in 
the top and bottom quintiles. This is particularly noticeable for the Dilnot central recommendations.  
                                                          
2
 The Government’s policy statement also contained an analysis of the distributional effects of its 
planned reforms. Although that analysis takes a slightly different approach from ours, the general 
picture that emerges is very similar. 
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Since some aspects of the reforms – changes to the upper capital and, in the variants, changes to the 
lower capital threshold or reduction in tariff income – affect only those in care homes, Figure 4 
shows the distributional results for care home residents only. From these it can be seen that the 
difference in absolute average gains between the Government’s plans and the two variants that we 
have modelled is proportionately greater in the lower income quintiles than in the higher income 
quintiles. For example, in the lowest income quintile, the average gain when a reduction in tariff 
income is combined with the Government plans is £41 per week which is 17% higher than the 
average gain (£35) if the rate of tariff income is unchanged. Corresponding comparisons for quintiles 
2 and 3 are of similar size. However the comparison for the highest quintile is between £83 if tariff 
income is reduced and £78 if it is not, a difference of just 6%. The distributional effects of the variant 
in which the lower capital threshold is raised to £41,600 are remarkably similar to the variant in 
which tariff income is halved. The adoption of one of the variants would thus render the impact of 
reform more even across income groups.
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Figure 3: Distribution of gains by income: care home residents and home care recipients aged 85+, 2030, post-reform capital thresholds linked to earnings 
up to 2017, prices thereafter 
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Figure 4: Distribution of gains by income: care home residents aged 85+, 2030, post-reform capital thresholds linked to earnings up to 2017, 
prices thereafter 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have assessed the public expenditure costs and the distributional effects of the 
Government’s recently announced plans to reform the funding system for long-term care for older 
people in England. We have contrasted theeffects of the planned reforms with the central 
recommendations of the Dilnot Commission on Funding Care and Support and with two variants on 
the Government’s plans which would give additional help to care home residents with capital below 
the proposed higher capital threshold (£123,000 in 2017). 
Our projections are that the Government’s plans would add just under £2 billion to public 
expenditure on long-term care for older people by 2030 (at 2010 prices), compared with an extra 
£3.3 billion for the central Dilnot recommendations. Combining the Government’s plans with a 
halving of the rate of tariff income on capital between the lower threshold and the new higher upper 
threshold would have a public expenditure cost of £2.1 billion by 2030. An alternative approach with 
a similar cost would be to raise the lower capital threshold to around £40,000 in 2010 prices 
(£41,600 in 2017 prices).  
We project that under the government plans there would be some 115,000 more care service users 
receiving some public funding in 2030 than if the current system continued. This is in contrast to 
around 185,000 more publicly funded users in 2030 that we project under the central Dilnot 
recommendation. Supplementing the government plans with a halving of the rate of tariff income on 
capital between the upper and lower thresholds or increasing the lower threshold to £40,000 would 
mean around 1,500 more publicly funded users than under the government plan alone. 
The estimated weekly gains in absolute terms from all the reform options are greatest amongst care 
recipients in the highest quintile (fifth) of the income distribution for older people. For example, in 
2030, the Government’s plans would be worth £52 per week (2010 prices) on average to care 
recipients aged 85+ in the highest quintile compared with £20 for those in the lowest quintile. 
Expressed as percentages of income the gains vary much less across the income distribution.  
Focussing on care home residents, both of the two variants on the Government’s plans would be 
particularly advantageous, compared to the Government’s planned reform, to care home recipients 
in the lowest three quintiles of the income distribution. In 2030 the average gains of care home 
residents aged 85+ would be about 16% higher under these variants than under the proposed 
reforms compared with around 6% higher for the upper two quintiles. 
The system of financing long-term care in England is complex and will remain so after 
implementation of the Government’s reform proposals. This makes it hard to assess the effects of 
reforms without analysis such as we have presented in this paper. Our analyses have shown how 
altering different parameters in this complex system affect the costs to public funds and the financial 
benefits for older people in different parts of the income distribution.  
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